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While the commercial Internet today generates tens of billions of dollars in revenue a 
year, the passage of time gives a false sense of inevitability to this accomplishment. Learning 
and sheer serendipity shaped actions during the early days while value remained uncertain. 
The firms that commercialized dial-up Internet access in the United States from the mid- to 
late-1990s did not follow a prescribed road map, nor did those who deployed Wi-Fi from 
1999 onward. No firm in a young market such as these could have planned for all events.  
The commercial Internet is far from the only market where learning activities played 
a role. Firms in technically-oriented markets frequently engage in learning as a necessary 
consequence of – or as the unintended by-product of – participating in markets for goods and 
services whose value undergoes change.  Economic experiments pertain to any market 
experience that alters knowledge about the market value of a good or service (Rosenberg, 
1994; Stern, 2005). Stated succinctly, firms engage in economic experiments to reduce 
uncertainties about market value.  
The defining characteristic of this type of learning is that it involves experiences that 
cannot take place in a laboratory; scientists, engineers, or marketing executives cannot distill 
equivalent lessons from simply building a prototype or interviewing potential customers and 
vendors. Economic experiments involve more than just technical invention; they also lead to 
changes in business operations and organizational procedures that translate technology into 
economic value.  
What role did economic experiments play in the development of commercial Internet 
access? Section II of the essay considers this question and I conclude that economic 
experiments played an important role. That answer motivates the topic of Section III, which 
investigates: Do the private returns from participating in these experiments align with 
industry-wide returns? I argue that industry-wide returns exceed private returns, with several 
important exceptions. That conclusion motivates the topic of Section IV, which investigates: 
Does an emphasis on economic experiments provide insight about the specific types of 
policies that would encourage innovation over time in communications markets? Does this 
analysis hold lessons for Internet access policy, such as found in the net neutrality debate? 
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I.1. Outline of themes 
 
Highlighting the historical role of economic experiments leads to a shift in 
perspective on the creation of value in the commercial Internet. I argue that economic 
experiments encompass a range of market-based learning. They encompass many important 
activities related to the creation of value, such as when surprising sales reveal the previously 
unknown value of primitive technologies, when new designs make managers aware of 
broader uses for technologies invented for narrow applications, or when firms learn how to 
improve a business process with customer-suggested refinements. 
This contrasts with most historical studies of the commercial Internet. By and large, 
most discussions of the rise of the Internet have focused on the evolution of technological 
experimentation, i.e., the genesis of inventions from their unlikely origins. If experiments 
during commercialization receive attention, it is in the context of analyzing the exploitation 
of a small set of core technological standards (e.g., TCP/IP, HTML, etc).  Highlighting 
economic experiments, in contrast, emphasizes how the environment allowed for a range of 
alternative commercialization strategies – in terms of pricing structures, marketing strategies, 
and the like – when market participants had choices among several options. This provided 
great leeway for a diversity of commercial outcomes. 
Highlighting economic experiments leads to a refocusing of policy analysis. To date, 
there has been considerable analysis of regulatory actions pertaining to broadband, as well as 
analysis of the legal environment around participation in open source communities and 
standardization efforts.
1 However, while some research has examined the policies for 
markets where exploratory behavior is prevalent, these are not articulated as issues about the 
creation of value, or about nurturing economic experiments to support such creation.
2 
In contrast, because this framework focuses attention on the incentives of vendors, it 
concludes that the industry wide value – i.e., benefit less cost – from economic experiments 
exceeds private value due to the presence of positive information externalities. There are two 
major exceptions to such a generality. The first exception arises when there is no link 
                                                 
1 There is considerable writing in these veins. See e.g., Lessig (1999), Sidak (2003), Crandall (2005), 
Neuchterlein and Weiser (2005). More will be discussed in the text. 
2 See e.g., Blumenthal and Clark (2001), Alleman and Rappaport (2005), Clark et al (2005), Clark et al 
(2006), Goldfarb, Kirsch and Pfarrer (2005), Bauer (2006), or Greenstein (2007). More will be discussed in 
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between costs and benefit, as when one firm incurs the costs of an economic experiment 
while another gains the benefit. The other exception arises in settings where the negative 
externalities are present and large. Both circumstances can lead private and industry-wide 
cost and benefit to be out of alignment.  
That insight will highlight several challenging problems faced by regulators in 
communications markets. An example of the challenges this presents arises in the net 
neutrality debate. This debate has historical antecedents in policy decisions within 
telecommunications markets, where regulated firms – principally local telephone companies 
– acted as complements (in supply) to the innovative services of others with whom they also 
competed (for end users). More recently, policy has moved towards permitting discretion to 
broadband carriers, both telephone companies and other carriers, such as cable companies. 
Net neutrality advocates worry that carriers possess too much discretion. 
I reinterpret the debate through the lens of economic experiments, and show how this 
debate could focus on value creation instead of (or in addition to) focusing on the distribution 
of existing value, as it typically does. Policy could seek to raise incentives for value creation, 
either by raising incentives at carriers to undertake exploration, and/or by reducing the 
negative externalities broadband carriers might impose on other economic experiments.  
This refocusing leads to a proposal for incorporating economic experiments into the 
debate about net neutrality, discussed at length in the text. The proposal leads to a set of 
conclusions not typically found in the net neutrality debate. The proposal gives considerable 
discretion to broadband carriers if they act only as carriers, such as discretion for retail and 
wholesale price discrimination (within some binding limits applying to the latter). When 
carriers have economic interests in content markets, however, the proposal leads to a three 
part test that limits carrier discretion within specific bounds, with the intent of nurturing 





This model of economic experiments overlaps with another model for analyzing 
learning behavior:  “user-oriented” innovation in communications markets.
3 As in that 
                                                 
3 This is a growing literature, starting with Von Hippel (1988). It also is labelled “lead user” studies. Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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approach, the economic experiments framework explains how innovation becomes embodied 
in commercial form, and highlights the links between the experience of market participants 
and the conceptualization of an idea. Related, this framework also resembles the examination 
of learning in user-communities, such as analysis of wireless Internet applications.
4 As in that 
approach, this essay also highlights the factors nurturing experiential-based learning about 
new value in newly deployed technologies. 
In contrast to both literatures, this framework places less importance on user 
communities, instead focusing on how lessons spread – typically between vendors. To be 
clear, the framework also stresses the importance of user communities that aid the sharing of 
lessons, such as lead-user committees. However, the broader emphasis leads to other 
implications for firms and policy makers.  
Also significant for policy, the emphasis from the lens of economic experiments 
differs with the emphasis found in the common “ladder model” (which Gomory labeled and 
critiqued in 1997). The typical ladder model begins with events in a laboratory and moves 
through stages into commercialization.
5 The model of economic experiments does not begin 
with events in a laboratory and is not a sequential model. Instead, the model of economic 
experiments emphasizes activities outside of a laboratory, such as innovations arising after 
experience in the market. It also focuses on the spreading of lessons. As a result, it develops 
insights the ladder model does not, such as how to think about regulatory issues for industries 
undergoing learning. In brief, there are situations in which both models provide useful 
insight,
6 but policymakers should not rely exclusively on the ladder model, because it 
overlooks some innovative conduct that improves the economic performance of society.    
Many observers have identified the need for a dynamic regulatory policy more attune 
with the innovation behavior found in modern communications. The key contribution of this 
essay is in the orientation. The model of economic experiments can yield quite different 
insights about the merits and drawbacks of specific proposals for communications policy.  I 
review those differences with the extant (and extensive) literature later in the essay.   
 
                                                 
4 See e.g., Sandvig (2004 and 2007).  
5 See Gomory (1997) for a discussion about why exposing this model to scrutiny would help eliminate the 
mental monopoly it holds on the actions of many managers. 
6 For example, the original investment by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Agency) in the 
fundamental science of packet switching led to events that broadly fits the stages in the ladder model.  Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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II.ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS IN INTERNET ACCESS MARKETS 
 
Economic experiments are heterogeneous in practice. To organize the discussion, I 
begin with two broad types of experiments. The first type, directed experiments, occurs when 
firms deliberately invest in their own operations with existing customers in ways that allow 
them to learn something that benefits their businesses. The second type, undirected 
experiments, occurs when firms monitor the conduct of others, seeking to learn lessons from 
the experience of others and through the interplay of their activities with one another.  
The practical distinction between directed and undirected economic experiments is 
not clear-cut in all circumstances, but general tendencies distinguish one from another. 
Directed experiments tend to be incremental in technical scope and ambition (with important 
exceptions described below). Motivated by the private desire to learn something, these 
economic experiments aim to learn lessons useful to the organization conducting the 
experiment. Undirected experiments also yield useful learning, but do not arise in such a 
deliberate fashion. Rather, learning arises from the actions of many firms, yielding lessons 
whose specific features are not anticipated. In such circumstances, firms invest in learning 
lessons from unanticipated events.   
In either case market participants engage in economic experiments because they have 
a limited ability to imagine future (even near-term) economic activity in all its complexity 
and detail. Many choices among the details about operations to serve buyers cannot be 
learned except through trial and error. Even market participants with extraordinary 
imaginations still find it impossible to forecast, for example, how demand will change when 
prices decline drastically for complementary goods or how the majority of customers will 
react to different menus of products. Even if early versions of a technology have partially 
diffused to leading adopters, the rest of the population of adopters, who will be using the 
technology when prices drop and capabilities expand, may have different characteristics and 
needs from the first users. Planning activities can help, but they can never completely 
overcome these limitations. 
An additional factor also shapes industry-wide learning: any one firm faces difficulty 
forecasting the actions of all of its near competitors or business partners. For example, 
managers may not be able to resolve open questions about the actions of their business Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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partners until they observe events in a market. What services are offered at what set of 
prices? What features are emphasized? To what specific user segments are other firms 
appealing? These decisions reveal considerable information about what managers at rivals 
and partners are thinking. In addition, the success or failure of certain activities (over time) 
reveals considerable information about which risks paid off and which did not. In brief, firms 
learn from observing one another’s actions, i.e., more learning takes place only after 
observing actions than after reading about plans. 
What is the value of economic experiments? I will focus on the value associated with 
the creation of knowledge from experiential learning, and the initial spreading of that 
learning. The private value gained from investing in an economic experiment is associated 
with the benefits the lessons yield. For example, lessons may increase revenue, reduce costs, 
or enhance the survivability of firms. Only some of these gains will be measurable.  
The industry-wide value from such experiments can diverge from private value as 
lessons spread. One firm’s economic experiment may yield information that benefits another 
firm that did not conduct that experiment. Beyond that generality, the spreading of lessons 
exhibits enormous heterogeneity. Technical lessons tend to spread quickly, while complex 
business lessons not. In later sections I will describe why. 
 
 
II.1. Directed economic experiments       
 
This section uses the historical example of Internet access markets to flesh out the 
analytical framework and establish its relevance. This example illustrates the predominant 
features of a directed economic experiment: (1) Many firms try similar experiments, but not 
every firm tries the same experiment; (2) Not all experiments succeed, but valuable lessons 
are learned from both success and failure; (3) In retrospect, it may be possible to rationalize 
the purpose behind an experiment that turned out to be successful, but such certainty does not 
characterize the outlook at the time of the experiments; (4) The value of experiments changes 
over time, and firms alter their experiments in response to market conditions.  
At the outset of the commercial Internet access market value was uncertain due to a 
surprising sequence of events. The release of the Mosaic browser began in the fall of 1993.  Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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Netscape released its beta browser in the fall of 1994, gained publicity in the winter of 1995, 
and followed with its initial public offering (IPO) in August. Then Microsoft unveiled 
Internet Explorer in December 1995. Around the same time, a number of other entrants also 
began exploring new businesses, including Yahoo!, EBay, Amazon, Vermeer, and others.  
Many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) wrestled with fundamental decisions about 
how to build a business around the browser. This innovation raised expectations about future 
demand for access to the Internet, but did not generate certainty about how suppliers could 
best serve that demand. These events fueled expectations among industry insiders, futurists, 
and venture investors that substantial demand for the Internet among households and 
businesses would emerge quickly. That generated initiatives by firms to build ahead of the 
anticipated demand.  
By 1996 ISPs offered service in every major U.S. city, and many large firms had 
begun building national networks. The growth was astounding to mainstream infrastructure 
firms in computing and communications.
7 By the fall of 1996, there were over twelve 
thousand local phone numbers in the United States to call for commercial Internet access, 
and more than sixty-five thousand by the fall of 1998.
8 That build-out involved both scores of 
large national firms and thousands of small local firms.    
The build-out of ISPs did not happen without considerable experimentation to resolve 
many open questions. A crucial question at the outset concerned the design of the opening 
page—or, as it was subsequently labeled, portal—that users would see when they first 
clicked on their browser.
9  What should an ISP do? Should it design its own portal 
(potentially at great expense), default to another’s (such as Excite or Yahoo!), or leave the 
decision to users altogether?  
There were many contrasting strategies for addressing the question. Different ISPs 
made distinct choices and learned different lessons about the trade-offs between these 
choices. No single choice dominated, and as firms learned more, perceptions about the costs 
and benefits of each changed over time.  Some ISPs maintained minimal home pages, which 
many marketed as a virtuous attempt to give users freedom to choose for themselves among 
                                                 
7 Greenstein (2007) discusses why existing infrastructure firms were “surprised” by these developments. 
8 See Downes and Greenstein (2002) for a description of the dial up market, or Downes and Greenstein 
(2007) for an analysis for why some areas had more entry than others. 
9 For a review of technologies behind the browser and portal, and an analysis of the factors that shaped 
their evolution, see Haigh (2007).   Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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Yahoo!, Excite, Lycos, and a myriad of other young portals then springing up.  Of these, a 
portion succeeded with—or in some views, in spite of— this choice.  
It is always possible to rationalize (after the fact) why a firm made the choices it 
made. For example, even though many new ISPs openly derided America On-Line (AOL) 
for its strategy, the company chose to continue activity it already performed in the era of 
bulletin boards, perceiving that its prior investments in community building would continue 
to have value as its users transitioned to using the Internet more frequently. Its portal 
decisions continued to nurture those communities. AOL supplemented those actions with 
other practices that some of its largest rivals, such as CompuServe, did not pursue, such as 
using login names and email addresses using natural language labels instead of combinations 
of letters and numbers.  
While AOL’s choice may seem savvy in retrospect, many Internet enthusiasts then 
regarded it as risky. Indeed, AOL was the only firm among the existing large “on-line service 
providers” to succeed with its strategic choices in the medium term.  For example, AOL was 
the only firm to attract the mass-market user with investment in a walled garden (i.e., an 
approach that protected content, or, in the eyes of technically sophisticated vendors, “spoon 
fed” content to users), which both controlled a large fraction of the user experience while 
sacrificing sophisticated users to other suppliers.   
Not all of these types of experiments turned out well. As noted, CompuServe, 
Prodigy, and Genie all failed at an approach with similarities to AOL’s, whereas Microsoft 
Network (MSN) attempted a similar strategy and, with the help of its marketing advantages 
and budgetary tolerance for operating losses, did not exit. Nevertheless, MSN was no better 
than a distant second to AOL in market share throughout the 1990s. 
As further example, in the mid- to late-1990s some cable companies believed they did 
not understand Internet users requirements, so they ceded these decisions initially to others, 
such as, for example, @home. Eventually, @home merged with Excite to gain access to the 
perceived advantage of owning a portal, a decision that was regretted by several cable firms 
later. When the cooperation between cable firms and @home/Excite ended, it produced a 
large amount of recrimination, and the transition was not smooth for users.
10   
                                                 
10 See e.g., Wagner (2002).  Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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Although this experiment was not financially successful, the  surviving firms—cable 
companies, in this case—learned valuable lessons about how to structure their ISP services. 
First, certain useful “investments” were recreated, such as geographic caching of content, 
and, second, certain “mistakes” were avoided, such as not depending on advertising for 
revenue.
11 
Exploration focused on other fundamental determinants of value, as well, such as the 
price paid for services. For example, throughout 1995 to 1998, many firms experimented 
with offering different contracting plans to households.  Specifically, the earliest entrants into 
commercial ISP services borrowed the practices of bulletin boards, such as pricing per hour 
or per service. By 1995 there was a general movement among new entrants to offer unlimited 
monthly service for a fixed price, which was thought to accommodate browsing behavior and 
to be more acceptable to those using faster modems, such as 28K modems.
12  
After AT&T WorldNet announced its intention to enter the household market with a 
$20-per-month contract, this contractual form became the focal standard, eventually leading 
to the end of marginal pricing of services.  AOL’s conversion in early 1996 was the last, 
most publicized, and most difficult of these conversions among the largest ISPs at the time.
13  
It would be an error to think that AOL’s well-publicized troubles were the end of 
experiments with prices. Experiments continued for years, but only the major successes 
received wide publicity. There were many attempts to give users choices among monthly 
hourly limitations in exchange for discounts.
14 There were also many attempts to learn how 
much firms could alter the definition of “unlimited” without generating a large user 
backlash.
15 
                                                 
11 See e.g., Rosston (2007) for an analysis of the changing views of cable firms about the source of value 
from controlling or not controlling a portal and ISP. 
12 For more on the evolution of pricing in this time period, see Stranger and Greenstein (2007). 
13 See Swisher’s (1998) account of this crisis. AOL’s user base reacted to the introduction of unlimited 
pricing by increasing frequency of use and length of time per session. That behavior produced capacity 
issues, experienced by uses as busy signals.  
14 For example, many firms offered discounts of 50% in exchange for limitations of 60 hours per month 
(combined with penalties for exceeding this limit). This type of offered received a cool reception from most 
users even though over 90% of household users had use underneath such a limit. See the discussion in 
Stranger and Greenstein (2007).  
15 For example, some firms imposed automated session termination after a fixed period when the account 
experienced no use. Other ISPs tried to put fine print into their contracts that imposed high penalties for use 
that exceeded extremely high use, such as 150 hours per month.   Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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Most of these experiments with prices did not generate a significant reaction among a 
large set of users. In 1999, one such experiment did: a set of entrepreneurial firms 
experimented with formats that offered free dial-up access services in exchange for requiring 
users to view advertising.  Netzero eventually was the most successful entrant of this form, 
though, arguably, that success arose because Netzero departed from its initial strategy and 
eventually charged for access.
16  In other words, the most fundamental determinant of value 
in the retail household market—the contracting terms and pricing norms for access—
continued to evolve throughout the entire first decade of the commercial Internet. 
 
 
II.2. Undirected experiments   
 
 
While directed experiments in Internet access markets might have partially motivated 
the actions of any single firm, it would be an error to regard every lesson learned as resulting 
entirely from only one firm’s actions. Rather, the interplay of firms, their actions, and their 
economic experiments yielded a form of serendipity in learning—learning that resulted from 
the unanticipated combination of lessons learned from several actions or sources.  
Though such learning does not come through a deliberate economic experiment, it 
does not necessarily arise without cost. A firm who seeks to learn it may need to invest in an 
array of learning activities, such as tracking the experience at other firms, monitoring other 
experiments, and engaging key personnel in information-gathering activities in industry-wide 
conferences or organizations. 
This section uses the historical example of wireless Internet access markets to flesh 
out the analytical framework and establish its relevance. This example illustrates the 
predominant features of an undirected economic experiment: (1) Many firms benefit from the 
same market-based experience, but not all firms get the same value from the same undirected 
experiment; (2) Valuable lessons arise from combinations of events; (3) It may be possible in 
retrospect to rationalize the direction pursued by a collection of experiments, but such 
direction does not characterize the outlook at the time; (4) From a private firm’s viewpoint, 
                                                 
16 This strategy turned out to be effective for entry, but not for a sustainable business. Eventually, after 
growing a service for several million users, then merging with another firm, Juno, Netzero adopted a 
different pricing contract, one with a minimal monthly charge. Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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the value of an undirected experiment involves some serendipity.  
Futurists had predicted the rise of mobile computing even before the rise of the 
commercial Internet. After the boom in Internet access investment began in 1995, those 
predictions were made with additional urgency. Several related efforts arose, including 
several to design short-range data communications standards, such as HomeRF and 
Bluetooth.
17 In addition, because of the tremendous number of investments in technology 
made by cellular equipment providers and carriers to carry data over their infrastructure, a 
substantial number of futurists foresaw wireless data services emerging out of the cellular 
phone industry as part of a number of initiatives in 3G (third generation) technologies. This 
large effort involved virtually every equipment firm and carrier in the cellular phone 
business, as well as many others.
18 
Most of those predictions turned out to be correct in a broad sense—that is, there was 
substantial demand for wireless data communication technologies. Yet, in the specific sense, 
HomeRF did not generate the enthusiastic sales that those who designed it predicted—even 
though the designers considered it technically superior to the alternatives.
19  In addition, after 
a slow start, Bluetooth eventually found its way into a variety of products, particularly 
attachments to cell phones and many other consumer devices, but largely not computing 
devices. The 3G products and services also did not grow as hyped, initially gaining little 
traction with U.S. consumers.  It is only recently that 3G products have started to make a dent 
in the United States.  
More surprising, a wireless fidelity technology – now popularly known as Wi-Fi – 
became dominant. Wi-Fi did not arise from a single firm’s innovative experiment. Rather, 
Wi-Fi began as something different that evolved through economic experiments at many 
firms. The evolution arose from the interplay of strategic behavior, coordinated action among 
designers, deliberate investment strategies, learning externalities across firms, and a measure 
of simple and plain good fortune.  
                                                 
17  Both were founded in 1998. The former was organized by firms such as Motorola and Seimens, and at 
its peak involved over a hundred companies before it disbanded; while the latter was established by 
Ericsson, Sony-Ericsson, IBM (International Business Machines), Intel, Toshiba, and Nokia, and currently 
still exists, involving thousands of firms.     
18 For a review of many of these developments, see e.g., Aronson, Cowhey and Richards (2007).  
19 For speculation about why HomeRF failed, see, e.g., http://www.cazitech.com/HomeRF_Archives.htm.  Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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What eventually became Wi-Fi originated from discussions about a technical standard 
designed at the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) Subcommittee 11 for 
Committee 802. The IEEE sponsors many committees to design standards. Committee 802 
was formed in the early 1980s, before the commercial Internet was ever proposed. It was 
well known among computing and electronics engineers because it had helped design and 
diffuse the Ethernet standard.
20 By the mid-1990s it had grown larger, establishing 
committees for many areas, ostensibly to extend the range of uses for Ethernet.  
Subcommittee 802.11 was established in 1990. Like all subcommittees of this broad 
family of committees, it concerned itself with a specific topic, in this case, designs for 
interoperability standards to enable wireless data traffic using Ethernet protocol over short 
ranges. As with all such committees, any standards emerging from these discussions were not 
legally binding on industry participants, but the committee was formed with the hope that 
such a standard could act as focal point, helping different firms make products, such as 
routers and receivers, that were interoperable. As with most such committees, it tried to 
involve members who brought appropriate technical expertise and who represented the views 
of most of the major suppliers and users of the type of equipment in which this standard 
would be embedded.   
There were many potential business applications for this standard – one of the earliest 
prototypes had been in wireless terminals
21 and another had been in a large-scale wireless 
local area network for a university campus
22 – and focusing on any of them was not a bad 
idea. After all, it is often a smart strategy to focus development on valuable use or on users 
with a history of tolerance for the technical challenges affiliated with being an early adopter. 
At first, the group was comprised of enthusiastic designers focused on the needs of big users 
of local area network technologies (e.g., FedEx, United Parcel Service, Wal-Mart, Sears, and 
Boeing)—companies that they believed would have valuable uses for short-range wireless 
Ethernet (e.g., in large warehouses with complex logistical operations). More to the point, the 
                                                 
20 The story of the growth of a local area network market around the activities in committee 802 is well told 
in Von Burg (2001).  
21 Vic Hayes, one of the earliest developers of wireless technologies and standards, and chair of the IEEE 
802.11 committee during the 1990s, first developed wireless technologies for NCR (at sub-division of 
AT&T then, today a division of Agere Systems). In that capacity he first developed wireless terminals for 
stockbrokers. See Krariff (2003). 
22 See the description of Hills (2005), who began developing the equivalent of a Wi-Fi network for the 
Carnegie Mellon campus in Pittsburgh, starting in 1993.  Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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original charter and motivation for this subcommittee was not focused on what eventually 
became a large market in the home and in public spaces (e.g., coffee shops).   
Federal spectrum policy cooperated with these technical initiatives – indeed, nothing 
would have succeeded in its absence. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
holds authority to license or bar companies from using spectrum. In late April of 1996, after 
several groups had begun discussing designs, the FCC initiated a “Notice for Proposed Rule 
Making” to make available unlicensed spectrum for what became known as Unlicensed 
National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) devices. After deliberating over that summer, the 
commission made spectrum available. It was understood that the commission anticipated 
“short range, high-speed wireless digital communications” and devices that supported “the 
creation of new wireless local area networks ("LANs") and … facilitate wireless access to the 
National Information Infrastructure ("NII").” Beyond that, however, little else was specified 
about the design or application. The order that emerged on January 9, 1997, stated “we are 
adopting the minimum technical rules necessary to prevent interference to other services and 
to ensure that the spectrum is used efficiently.”
 23 
Subsequent events fit a category of unanticipated learning that Rosenberg (1995) 
labels (and I paraphrase here) “an invention motivated by a specific application that 
unexpectedly finds broader use.” Specifically, the Subcommittee 802.11 first proposed a 
standard in 1997 that received many beta uses, but also failed to resolve many 
interoperability issues (among many). Learning from this experience, the committee rewrote 
the standard. What came to be known as 802.11a was ratified in early 2000.  Just prior to that 
in late 1999, the committee published Standard 802.11b, which altered some features 
(changing the frequency of spectrum it used, among other things). The latter caught on 
quickly and eventually widely, partly because it was licensed for usage in Europe and Asia as 
well as North America, while for some time 802.11a was only licensed in North America.
24 
Because many vendors had experimented with earlier variations of this standard, the 
publication of 802.11b generated a vendor response from those who were already making 
equipment—and others soon thereafter. As it turned out, it also generated a response from 
                                                 
23 All quotes are from the review of FCC policies on http://www.cybertelecom.org/broadband/wifi.htm, a 
non-profit site which links to the orginal FCC material and summarizes it.  Subsequent clarifications and 
rules emerged several times thereafter, partly to promote equipment export to other parts of the world by 
aligning spectrum in the US with similar policies elsewhere.  
24 Lui (2001) or Krarif (2003). Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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Internet enthusiasts, who at the time began using this equipment in a variety of settings, 
campuses, buildings, public parks, and coffee shops. Unsurprisingly, vendors tried to meet 
this demand as well.  
Around the same time as the publication of 802.11b, firms that had helped pioneer the 
standard—including 3Com, Aironet (now a division of Cisco), Harris Semiconductor (now 
Intersil), Lucent (now Agere), Nokia, and Symbol Technologies—formed the Wireless 
Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA). WECA branded the new technology Wi-Fi, which 
was a marketing ploy for the mass market, since WECA’s members believed that “802.11b” 
was a much less appealing label. The aim was clear: nurture what enthusiasts were doing and 
broaden it into sales to a broader base of users.  
WECA also arranged to perform testing for conformance to the standard, such as 
certifying interoperability of antennae and receivers made by different firms. This is valuable 
when the set of vendors becomes large and heterogeneous, as it helps maintain maximum 
service for users with little effort on their part. In brief, while the IEEE committee designed 
the standard, a different body performed conformance testing. The difficulties experienced 
with incompatible equipment in 1997 had taught participants not to ignore this activity.   
Events then took on a momentum all of their own. Technical successes became 
widely publicized. Numerous businesses began directed experiments supporting what 
became known as hot spots, which was another innovative idea. A hot-spot in a public space 
could be free, installed by a home-owner, or maintained by a building association for all 
building residences, or supported by the café or restaurant or library trying to support its local 
user base. Or, it could be subscription-based, with users signing contracts with providers. The 
latter became common at Starbucks, for example, which subcontracted with T-mobile to 
provide the service throughout its cafés.  
A hot spot was a use far outside the original motivation for the standard. Yet, since 
nothing precluded this unanticipated use from growing, grow it did. It grew in business 
buildings, in homes, in public parks, and in a wide variety of settings, eventually causing the 
firms behind HomeRF to give up. The growing use of Wi-Fi raised numerous unexpected 
technical issues about interference, privacy, and rights to signals. Nevertheless, they did not Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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slow Wi-Fi’s growing popularity.
25  Web sites sprouted up to give users, especially travelers, 
directions to the nearest hot spot. As demand grew, suppliers gladly met it. As in a classic 
network bandwagon, the growing number of users attracted more suppliers and vice-versa. 
Unlike the prior examples, no single firm initiated an economic experiment that 
altered the state of knowledge about how to best operate equipment using IEEE Standard 
802.11b. However, like the prior examples, many firms responded to user demand, 
demonstrations of new applications, tangible market experience, vendor reactions to new 
market situations, and other events that they could not forecast but which yielded useful 
insights about the most efficient business actions to generate value.   
 
 




Virtually all firms perform directed experiments; and sometimes these experiments 
lead to a product or service that generates an undirected response from other firms as they 
watch, monitor, and compete with each other. Some firms learn from another firm’s directed 
experiment and consequently reap the benefits of the lessons learned without having to 
undertake the cost of performing the experiment.  Although some firms might try (and 
ultimately fail) to keep their directed experiments private, most recognize that they are part 
of a broader interplay of firms.  Thus, the original directed experiment leads to one or many 
undirected experiments.  Similarly, the process of building directed experiments on top of 
undirected ones requires a firm to watch and learn, and ultimately devise a directed 
experiment that takes advantage of that learning.       
Later events in the development of Wi-Fi illustrate how directed learning can build on 
an undirected economic experiment. Specifically, reacting to the undirected experiment that 
generated Wi-Fi, Intel performed a directed experiment that led to the creation of Centrino, a 
large program that would install wireless capability in its notebook computers. It was 
                                                 
25 For example, in high-density settings it was possible for there to be interference among the channels, or 
interference with other users of the unlicensed spectrum reserved by the FCC (Federal Communications 
Commission), such as cordless telephones. The diffusion of so many devices also raised  questions about 
norms for paying for access in apartment buildings, from neighbors, and others. See Sandvig (2004).   Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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officially launched in March 2003, though industry insiders knew about the plans much 
earlier. 
This section uses the historical example of the Centrino program to flesh out the 
analytical framework. This example illustrates the predominant features of interplay between 
directed and undirected economic experiments: (1) Many firms try experiments and build on 
each others’ experiments; (2) Lessons learned from both success and failure spread at the 
same time, seeding more experiments; (3) Economic experiments can and do arise in the face 
of inter-firm conflict; (4) The results from the interplay between economic experiments 
makes it particularly difficult to forecast value.   
This Centrino program is easy to misunderstand.  Embedding a Wi-Fi connection in 
all notebooks that used Intel microprocessors did not involve redesigning only the Intel 
microprocessor, which is the component for which Intel is best known.  It involved 
redesigning the motherboard for desktop PCs and notebooks by adding new parts.
26 This 
came with one obvious benefit, namely, it eliminated the need for an external card for the 
notebook, which was usually supplied by a firm other than Intel and installed by users or 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in an expansion slot. Intel hoped for additional 
benefits for users, such as more reliability, fewer set-up difficulties, longer-lived batteries 
(due to less need for heat reduction), thinner notebook designs (due to smaller cooling units) 
and less frequent incompatibility in new settings.  
Intel had crept into the motherboard business slowly over the prior decade as it 
initiated a variety of improvements to the designs of computers using its microprocessors. 
Years earlier, the firm had designed prototypes of these motherboards and by the time it 
announced the Centrino program, it was making some motherboards, branding them, and 
encouraging many of its business partners to make similar designs. The wireless capabilities 
of a notebook had not been the focus on these earlier programs, so the announcement of the 
Centrino program represented a shift in strategic aims and direction.
27    
Intel hoped that its endorsement would increase demand for wireless capabilities 
within notebooks by, among other things, reducing weight and size while offering users 
                                                 
26 Specifically, it involves designing an appropriate chipset and wireless network adaptor, as well as the 
Intel Microprocessor.  
27 For history and analysis of Intel’s investments in different projects, including, but not necessarily 
Centrino, and why its management chose to invest heavily in some complementary technologies and not 
others, see, e.g., Gawer and Cusumano (2002), and Gawer and Henderson (2007). Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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simplicity and technical assurances in a standardized function. The firm also anticipated that 
its branding would help sell notebooks using Intel chips and motherboard designs instead of 
using microchips from Advanced Micro Devices (AMD).  Furthermore, antenna and router 
equipment makers anticipated that a standardized format for wireless notebooks might help 
raise demand for their goods. 
Intel’s motherboard designs could increase the efficiencies of computers, but that 
benefit was not welcomed by every OEM who assembled PCs or other industry players. 
Firms such as Texas Instruments and Intersil had lobbied earlier for different designs for the 
802.11g upgrade, investing heavily in the efforts at committee 802.11. Neither of them had 
intended to help Intel’s business, and neither of them wanted to see Intel increase its 
influence over the designs that were deployed to most users.  
Moreover, as Intel’s design became employed more frequently, it eliminated some 
differences between OEMs and other component providers. Many of these firms, including 
motherboard suppliers and card makers, in addition to the OEMs, resented losing both 
control over their designs and did not want to lose the ability to strategically differentiate 
their own designs. Other OEMs liked the Intel design, since it allowed the firms to 
concentrate on other facets of their business.  
Only Dell was able to put up any substantial resistance, however, insisting on selling 
its own branded Wi-Fi products right next to Intel’s, thereby supporting some of the card 
makers. Despite Dell’s resistance, the cooperation from antenna makers and (importantly) 
users helped Intel reach its goals. By embedding the standards in its products, Intel made Wi-
Fi, or rather Centrino, easy to use, which proved popular with many users. 
Intel ran into several crises at first, such as insufficient parts for the preferred design 
and a trademark dispute over the use of its preferred symbol for the program. However, as 
desired, management learned many things from the experience and met strategic milestones, 
and subsequently, refined a large company-wide and industry-wide strategy. They initiated 
several related follow-on projects, such as contributing to writing upgrades in IEEE 
Committee 802.11 (to design 802.11n) and writing an upgrade to a whole new wireless 
standard for longer ranges (to design 802.16, a.k.a. Wi-Max, and related, 802.20).  
The Centrino example illustrates the array of deliberate firm activities taken during a 
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The activities in IEEE Committee 802.11 ended up affecting the activities of many other 
firms, such as equipment manufacturers, laptop makers, chip makers, and coffee shops, 
which then shaped new activities at the committee as well.   
This example also illustrates that economic experiments can – and do – happen in 
spite of overt conflict between firms. Those firms may be either direct competitors or 
partners in value chain with diverging interests. Conflict transparently arises, as it did here, 
when all can forecast that the success of one firm’s experiment adversely affects the business 




III. CREATING VALUE 
 
 
Firms expend costly resources on economic experiments, for instance, in assets and 
personnel to either conduct directed economic experiments or to learn from market events.  
In general, the private costs and benefits from economic experiments diverge from the 
industry-wide costs and benefits, with industry benefits being higher than private benefits. 
There are exceptions to that generality, however, and I consider them after analyzing the 
determinants of the private costs and benefits. 
 
III.1. Private costs and benefits from conducting experiments 
 
By helping market participants learn about the nature of demand in quickly evolving 
environments, companies can more effectively position their offerings and pricing structures. 
Such lessons increase value by: (1) generating more revenue through improvement of an 
existing service, (2) enhancing profits from lowering operation costs or avoiding higher 
investment expenses, or (3) enhancing pricing power through targeting services to customers 
better than rivals do. In an especially competitive setting, such lessons can (4) contribute to 
raising the probability of survival by teaching a firm to avoid outcomes where rivals can out-
maneuver them.    Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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In general, many of these benefits cannot be measured. If they can be measured – 
even partially – the private value of many lessons can be measured in terms of the additional 
revenue it contributes to a firm’s business and/or the additional cost savings it generates.  
Revenue might increase through one of several mechanisms. For instance, firms may 
learn to alter pricing practices, and those changes will alter total revenues. The history of ISP 
access pricing illustrates several examples. For example, the acceptable pricing norm among 
most users for hourly limitations changed over time, as ISPs learned about the reaction of 
different customer segments to distinct menus of choices. A similar statement could be made 
for the norms concerning whether it was appropriate to apply a separate charge for phone 
support or not to users who taxed the ISPs resources heavily. 
Some changes can increase sales volume of sales or prices. That was seen during the 
upgrade from 28K to 56K. Some firms gained a premium in their pricing. Some aspired to 
gain new customers or reduce turnover among their existing customers. Over time the market 
participants learned that the pricing premium was temporary, and the upgrade became part of 
a technological race among all firms.  
Pricing experiments often coincide with experiments regarding the range of services 
offered. During the mid to late 1990s, for example, virtually all ISPs experimented with 
changes to the standard bundle offered, such as default e-mail memory, instant messaging 
support, and hosting services in which the ISP maintained Web pages for clients.  Also, in 
response to user requests, some local ISPs arranged for the availability of phone numbers in 
other locales for traveling clients. A wide range of regional ISPs experimented with 
performing services complementary to access, such as hosting services, networking services, 
and Web design consultations.
28 Some of these additional services offered immediate 
opportunities for ISPs to explore ways to raise revenue, while others simply enhanced 
customer retention rates, which indirectly shaped the elasticity of demand for access services.  
Operational costs can be lowered as well. Firms might learn how to tailor investment, 
e.g., how to allocate capacity of new modem banks to satisfy the targeted customer base. 
Firms also may learn about appropriate procedures for doing business with one another – 
e.g., developing procedures between two peering firms when they experience issues handing 
data to one another. 
                                                 
28 See e.g., Greenstein (2000).  Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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Learning leading to cost reduction may be difficult to distinguish from learning that 
leads to enhanced revenue. For instance, as dial-up ISPs learned from one another about the 
efficient deployment of 56K modems, those who deployed it found they could charge a 
modest price premium for faster service (approximately five dollars), but that that premium 
disappeared in less than a year, after the modems became more common.
29 The ambiguities 
between costs and revenues also could arise with decisions about the scope of the firm. When 
ISPs chose to maintain minimal home pages, for example, it could be viewed as a cost-saving 
to the ISP. Yet, a modest investment in helping users customize those pages to their needs 
(e.g., giving help with “My-Yahoo”) could be an investment that leads to greater customer 
retention.  Better customer retention eventually manifests as greater sales values and higher 
firm prices, but it may be difficult to attribute a specific change in price or volume to only 
that investment. 
In general, the accumulation of experiments may support knowledge that plays a role 
in later economic experiments. In that latter sense, an economic experiment may be part of a 
broader positive cycle of experimentation. 
Importantly, the lessons learned from an experiment may or may not have any 
comparative value – i.e., in altering the value of a firm’s service in comparison to rivals. It 
will have such value, generally speaking, if a firm uniquely learns a lesson and no other rival 
does. It will not when all firms have it and, therefore, it does not support differentiation. The 
example of the upgrade to 56 modems illustrates this notion. When it was rare, firms with 
faster service charged a premium. That premium disappeared, however, as the upgrade 
became common.  
 
III.2. Industry-wide benefits 
 
 
Two additional factors shape the benefits and costs from economic experiments at the 
industry-wide level but do not shape costs and benefits at the private level. Generally 
speaking, all of these are hard to measure. This section highlights two themes: (1) Consumers 
reap some benefits from an experiment – in the form of lower prices and new services -- and 
these benefits do not necessarily play any role in the benefits experienced by the firm who 
                                                 
29 For documentation of this, see Stranger and Greenstein (2007).  Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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conducts a directed economic experiment. (2) One firm’s experiment shapes the actions of 
another, an effect that can take many forms, and these do not directly show up in a firm’s 
accounting. These are particularly hard to measure because one firm may benefit while 
another incurs a substantial fraction of the cost. 
Generally speaking, consumer benefits from economic experiments are difficult to 
measure except when it leads directly to a decline in price for an existing service. In 
practice, however, that is rare. Consumers may also benefit from higher quality goods, 
better supply of services that previously did not exist, or thicker supply of products 
tailored to niche demands, among many benefits for which no price may be recorded.  
An especially difficult-to-measure cost and benefit is the learning that takes place 
at all market participants as one participant learns from another. When a new service or 
improvement is reasonably permanent, the firm who commercializes it may see returns to 
the investment in the form of increases in final revenue or other strategic advantages.  If a 
new product or service is quickly imitated by all firms, it quickly becomes a standard 
feature of doing business in a downstream market. The benefits from the new technology 
are quickly passed onto consumers in the form of lower prices and/or better products. In 
this case, the benefits to a firm do not appear as an increase in revenues but may not 
appear as lower prices; but they exist nonetheless, in the form of losses the business 
avoided, or better quality services, which match the quality found elsewhere. 
By traditional economic reasoning, at least two externalities shape the difference 
between private and industry-wide learning. There is an information externality between 
firms, as when one firm’s directed experiment teaches another firm a lesson, or a set of 
actions interact in an undirected experiment and teach every industry participant a lesson. 
There is also an information externality over time, as when the lessons of prior experiments 
generate lessons on which further experiments are built. In practice, these two externalities 
are difficult to distinguish from one another.  
The positive information externalities between firms take one of two forms. In one 
case, what worked for one firm becomes known and imitated by others – e.g., success from 
an experiment at an ISP in one rural location in 1996 implied it might be profitable in 
another. Alternatively, what did not work for one firm becomes known and, therefore, 
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experiences in 1997, leading equipment firms to delay building plans until a more suitable 
design emerged and with institutional support for enforcing interoperability.   
Negative information externalities take a common form. That is, a successful 
experiment for one firm becomes known and implies a loss for someone else – e.g., Intel’s 
Centrino success in 2003 implied a loss at wireless card makers. Similarly, Netzero’s 
experience as an advertising-supported “free” ISP implied a loss at some incumbent ISPs, 
such as Earthlink or Juno. These examples imply that the industry-wide benefits from an 
experiment combine the positive return to this lessons at one firm (Intel/Netzero) with the 
negative return at another (a card maker/Earthlink), as well as the incremental benefit that 
goes to consumers (in the form of greater capabilities, new services, and/or lower prices).    
Inter-temporal externalities also lead to divergence between private costs and benefits 
and industry-wide costs and benefits. One party (in a directed economic experiment) or 
several parties (in an undirected economic experiment) assume the cost of generating lessons 
while many others gain the benefits later. That is, those who pay for lessons in an early 
market are not necessarily those who use them most profitably in a later market, but no 
contract between them governs the early investment.  
An important feature of inter-temporal externalities is the asymmetries to the costs 
and benefits of generating lessons about commercial failure. Lessons about how to avoid 
commercial failure can be as valuable as those who employ them, but the firm whose failure 
illustrates the lesson for others rarely, if ever, does so for that purpose, and almost never 
under contract with the others who (later) gain the benefit of the lessons learned from the 
failure.  In an extreme case, a firm may learn a lesson, teach others from its failure, but go 
bankrupt before it is able to use that lesson. Even though the lesson was expensive to the 
stockholders of the firm that initiated the experiment, it was inexpensive to the survivors.  
The history of Internet access is littered with examples of failures from which all 
other firms learned. For example, it is now accepted wisdom that users did not desire only a 
browser and phone numbers presented as if it were packaged software– as first marketed by 
Spry networks in “Internet in a Box.” Rather, users quickly migrated to ISPs who offer a 
different type of service with a different set of market features, combining local services with 
software tailored to their immediate demands (and tailored to some needs users did not know 
they had). It is also accepted wisdom that mass market users do not desire login names with Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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acronyms that are difficult to recall or do not relate to natural language names, as widely 
commercialized by CompuServe, for example. Most users also valued avoiding technically 
laborious set-up costs involving weeks of waiting, as embedded in early broadband services, 
such as ISDN.
30 The list goes on and on.  
These details of industry-wide learning – both positive and negative externalities – 
are not just the flotsam and residue of inexorable technical evolution, but, rather, these 
lessons became the foundation for later operations. It is well known, for example, that AOL 
learned a tremendous amount from the successes and failings of CompuServe and AT&T 
Worldnet and many others, and later implemented those lessons to some success, though they 
never paid the stockholders at CompuServe or Worldnet or any other ISP for new 
information – indeed, that was especially true when they bought what remained of 
CompuServe in 1999.   
More generally, many of these externalities underpin the emergence of an undirected 
economic experiment. When lessons spread between firms, then it is possible for every 
participant to build on the lessons of others. The industry wide value from economic 
experiments exceeds private value due to the prevalence of spreading lessons, i.e., the 
prevalence of positive information externalities between firms and over time.  
There are exceptions to such a generality, and these are historically common enough 
to merit consideration in practice. The most interesting exception arises when there is the 
potential for a misalignment between costs and benefit, as when one firm incurs the costs of 
an economic experiment while another gains the benefit. That is especially potentially 
problematic when the negative externalities are present and large, that is, when one firm’s 
private gain simultaneously reduces benefits for many, imposing a large burden on others.   
 
III.3. Spreading lessons 
 
Do different types of lessons exhibit different patterns of spreading after an 
experiment? Answering this question provides an important step towards understanding 
when private and industry-wide costs and benefits tend to diverge the most and least. This 
                                                 
30 For example, in their estimates of demand for broadband, Savage and Waldman (2005) find that most 
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section will use the historical experience of ISPs and Wi-Fi firms to highlight three themes: 
(1) There are four different types of lessons; (2) They differ in their tendencies to spread; (3) 
Most lessons that are incremental in scope, but a few are transformative. 
There are four distinct types of lessons.  The first are market lessons. These pertain to 
norms and patterns of market-based actions, such as how to write a contract that users find 
acceptable, and how to price services, and so on. Second, technical lessons pertain to the 
design of a piece of equipment—for example, knowing how to configure Wi-Fi so that it 
works in the type of space/location at all times that fits the supplier’s needs. Third, heuristic 
lessons combine both technical knowledge with either market or operational knowledge 
about how employees behave in firms and how customers react to firm behavior—for 
example, knowing how to deploy Wi-Fi for a maximal set of users. Fourth, complex lessons 
are marketing and operational lessons that involve many functions inside an organization—
for example, knowing how to integrate the use of Wi-Fi into a wide variety of other 
offerings.   
Private incentives to generate economic experiments will be less than the industry 
benefits in situations where lessons spread quickly and others benefit, as occurs with 
technical lessons, market lessons, and some heuristic lessons.  Several examples will 
illustrate these points.  
In 1995 the technical and market lessons were often rather trivial for a former 
bulletin-board firm to learn. The technical steps between an ISP and bulletin-board firm were 
relatively incremental—many firms just added a connection to the newly privatized Internet 
backbone.
31 Generally, these technical skills were common among those who operated 
bulletin boards. The related market steps were also incremental. Most bulletin board firms 
already had procedures in place to, for example, implement billing, publicize their services to 
local users, or address user service calls. Though the market actions changed, these were 
relatively easy to execute within existing organizational procedures. 
Technical lessons tend to spread easily because they tend to become codified 
                                                 
31 Most of these vendors already knew how to operate the basic building blocks for a point of presence (or 
POP) and support a basic service. The details of such a POP involved operating modem banks, servers, and 
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quickly.
32 It is almost tautological that such codification leads to easier transmission of the 
knowledge. For example, lessons about the design for a modem bank, a server, or other 
modem equipment became codified almost immediately, and for sound economic reasons. 
Most equipment suppliers in competitive markets would not consider selling equipment if 
information about it were not codified because most buyers demand it as a condition of 
purchase. Related, vendors of equipment also would have developed a set of marketing 
parameters for their buyers, guiding them towards best-practice deployment. 
Others lessons pertain to heuristic knowledge about how to operate that equipment 
efficiently.  For example, lessons about how to manage a Wi-Fi router at peak usage levels 
might not be known initially after a new piece of equipment became available for use, but 
such lessons would be learned through trial and error. As it turned out, those lessons spread 
to different coffee shops through a variety of mechanisms – i.e., franchises communicated 
with one another, bulletin boards emerged to support different types of users-groups, and the 
Wi-Fi association invested in support activities as well.   
Several factors affect the speed at which heuristic lessons spread.  On the one hand, 
some heuristic lessons spread slowly because, as sources of potential competitive advantage, 
they are guarded by the firms that first discover them.  For example, firms guard their 
strategies for how to deploy equipment efficiently and they may also guard information that 
indicates details about their future designs.  On the other hand, some firms, such as 
equipment providers, have strong incentives to spread lessons, since their spread contributes 
to further sales. Such tension was inherent in the diffusion of Wi-Fi, for example. While 
numerous channels opened to provide information to support deployment of frontier 
applications, some equipment manufacturers guarded the coding that was relevant to the next 
generation of designs, called “mesh-networks.”
33 
User and vendor organizations also shape spreading of lessons. Most dial-up ISPs 
used similar software tools for monitoring users, particularly after these showed up in the 
                                                 
32 In this context, “codified” refers to an idea put in a structured format that another technically trained 
individual can understand without having the author present – e.g., words, mathematical formulas, plans, 
pictures or professional drawings.  See, e.g., the discussion in Nelson (2007).  
33 Sandvig, Young and Meinrath (2004) document the tension between equipment firms and mesh-network 
user groups. The firms guarded their code, delaying experimentation at user groups, because the firms were 
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discussion boards at an Open Source project, such as Apache, the most popular web server.
34 
The community effectively coordinated many innovative efforts for dial-up ISPs in the mid 
to late 1990s, by sharing multiple upgrades and fixes to the source code among ISPs. This is 
far from the only example. Designs embedded in standards in many organizations also 
contributed to sharing of lessons. Organizations, such as the IETF and W3C, for instance, 
also facilitated the movement of lessons.
35 
The variance in idiosyncratic factors also can slow the codification of such heuristic 
lessons. First, one community of users may differ from another. For example, peak ISP usage 
occurs around the same time of day in different locations, but the similarities end there. 
Surfing behavior varies according to gender, family status, age, education, and income of the 
members of the household, the sum of which varies across cities, and even from one vendor 
to another within the same city. Such variety interferes with finding commonalities in, for 
example, marketing strategies (for a new feature) across locations or vendors. 
In addition, a heuristic operating rule established to resolve other operational issues 
might interfere with the functionality of a new lesson. For example, most ISPs wanted a way 
to limit overuse of capacity, especially when users failed to log off after ceasing or delaying 
use. Some ISPs instituted rules for automating log offs after short periods of nonuse, while 
others did not because users resented it (and, as a result, would leave for other vendors). 
Some vendors instituted special clauses into their contracts that eliminated “unlimited use,” 
authorizing them to charge penalties for exceeding especially high monthly usage (e.g., over 
100 hours a month). Modem capacity usage differed depending on these rules. Any heuristic 
lesson about how to operate new equipment at capacity would have to take into account such 
rules, but such variety interfered with uniform rules for all operators. 
Not all lessons can be reduced to simple heuristics—some are complex lessons. These 
might emerge, for example, from lengthy investigations by firms seeking to lower cost or 
generate extra revenue. They often are interdependent, where one operational goal reinforces 
the other, or associated with unique firm features, such as scale.  In either case, complex 
                                                 
34 As the Apache founders make clear on their own web page, in February 1995 they sought to improve and 
coordinate further improvements to the NCSA server software, which had lost its key personnel. The 
NCSA tried to revive the software in April, but then quickly cooperated with the Apache effort. See 
http://httpd.apache.org/ABOUT_APACHE.html. Accessed March, 2007. 
35 See Simcoe (2006) for a general analysis of many of the actions at the IETF, and a view about why 
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lessons cannot be easily summarized by a simple heuristic rule-of-thumb or by an answer to a 
single question. Almost by definition, these lessons resist immediate codification and are the 
slowest to move from firm to firm.  
As with heuristic lessons, ISPs hesitate to share complex business lessons. For 
example, they would not lightly discuss with other firms which lines of business best 
complemented their access business.  Firms also hesitate to share information about what sort 
of costly activities build customer retention most effectively—for example, did users have 
greater willingness to pay incrementally for phone service or more free storage for e-mail, 
and which of these would users appreciate as a standard part of their contract?   
ISPs also were hesitant to share their assessments of the costs, user habits, and further 
prospects for new services. For example, AOL did not openly share the lessons it had learned 
about the value of the instant messaging service it operated before making a bid in June of 
1998 to buy Mirabilis, operator of ICQ, which at that point was the largest free standing 
unaffiliated instant messaging service in the Internet. AOL kept its views secret for obvious 
reasons. Had it discussed them openly, it would have affected the bargaining prior to the 
merger, possibly not in AOL’s favor.  
As with heuristic lessons, the same factors interfered with codification and the 
spreading of complex lessons, namely, idiosyncrasies arising from differences across 
communities and between other operating rules.  That does not means complex business 
lessons never spread. Rather, they spread with more effort and at greater cost. In general, 
they spread more slowly and to fewer firms at any point in time.  
These examples support a modified version of the commonly stated canard that “all 
ideas are public goods.” Rather, some ideas are public goods, and, due to the conditions 
shaping the spread of lessons, some remain privately held for a short period. Even while 
technical information and market lessons move quickly between locations and firms, the 
ability of a firm to prevent direct rivals from imitating its business actions immediately slows 
others. Some complex lessons do not tend to spread to others, at least for a short time. 
These examples show that lessons differ in the extent of the benefit others receive 
from their creation. Most lessons involve incremental changes, so in most practical 
circumstances the effect of spreading lessons becomes apparent only after accumulation of 
many. Yet, that is not always so. Because some ideas spread quickly to others, a non-Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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incremental lesson – either a market, technical or heuristic lesson – can have high value to 
many industry participants, especially when that idea would not have arisen otherwise.
36 Call 
such an idea an “iconoclastic” one. It is non-incremental in scope and differs dramatically 
from common practice at the time of introduction. If it succeeds it can be transformative for 
the industry, especially if it spreads widely. Almost by definition, it is rare to observe many 
firms with successful implementation of iconoclastic economic experiments in practice.   
This type of economic experiment is important, rare, and valuable. When lessons 
spread from such experiments, their effect can be dramatic, yielding large benefits to many 
firms and end-users. For example, bulletin board providers played the role of iconoclast 
commercializer in the rise of the Internet, diffusing browser-based service into a market 
where many other large incumbents had considered such a service to not be valuable. The 
lessons learned by bulletin board firms covered more than just technical advance (and they 
certainly developed those in abundance). The first generation of ISPs also developed 
economic experiments that resulted in numerous market and heuristic lessons. Since so few 
incumbent firms recognized the importance of the browser prior to its commercialization, I 
conclude that these innovations otherwise would not have arisen as quickly and put into 
practice in the economy had the experimentation by these ISPs not taken place.
37  
In general, I conclude that, though there is a range of possibilities, for the most part 
the industry wide cost and benefit from economic experiments exceeds the private cost and 
benefit. That conclusion motivates an approach to policy, one that focuses on creating value 
by encouraging economic experiments. The approach seeks to remove barriers to conducting 
economic experiments, with the general presumption that more economic experiments 
benefits society, most often incrementally and occasionally by a substantial amount. 
 
 
IV. REINTERPRETING NET NEUTRALITY 
 
Does an emphasis on economic experiments provide insight about the specific types 
                                                 
36 The studies of lead users also highlight a related observation. That is, a lead user with an unusual 
enthusiasm or desire to push in a new direction may become the catalyst for exploring new designs and 
non-incremental business possibilities, which later grow into wide uses. See Von Hippel (1988) about lead 
users, and Sandvig (2004, 2007) about wireless technology lead users in particular.   
37 For more on this theme, see e.g., Greenstein (2007). Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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of policies that would encourage innovation over time in communications markets? As an 
illustration, I consider issues found in a contemporary debate in communications policy that 
goes under the heading of “net neutrality.” In practice, this debate has become quite broad.
38 
Instead of examining every aspect of it, I concentrate on how policy shapes the rate and 
direction of economic experiments. Such a framing narrows the scope of the investigation but 
focuses it in a useful fashion. Rather than focusing on the distribution of value between 
market participants, as this debate often does, I focus on the links between policy, economic 
experiments, and value creation. This focus exposes strengths and weaknesses in the most 
common arguments, as well as raises important open questions. In general, this approach 
motivates policies aimed at identifying negative externalities and tries to use policy to limit 
their occurrence.
39   
 
IV.1. Origins of the net neutrality debate 
 
Many facets of the net neutrality debate find antecedents in recent history in Internet 
markets. In the late 1990s, cable firms began deploying Internet access over cable lines and 
telephone companies began deploying digital subscriber lines (DSL), principally as 
asymmetric DSL, with different bandwidths for downloading and uploading content. Users 
began to adopt these options in large numbers after 2000. The fraction of Internet households 
with broadband grew from less than five percent in the summer of 2000 to approximately 
thirty percent of households in late 2006.
40  
To net neutrality advocates, the growth in the importance of broadband carriers raises 
issues about whether policies should allow broadband carriers to have the discretion to 
conduct economic experiments without restraint.  These concerns need to be understood in 
context. The last major legislative initiative for communications was the 1996 Telecom Act. 
Numerous provisions regarding telephone regulation and competition took primary urgency 
                                                 
38 There are many opinions about which recent changes most informs the present debate. See e.g., Lessig 
(1999), Weiser (2003), Alleman and Rappoport (2006), Atkinson and Weiser (2006), Wu and Yoo (2006), 
Owen (2007) or Speta (2007). This is far from an exhaustive list. 
39 Another approach, which I will not discuss, might argue for changes in intellectual property (or related 
mechanisms) to align the private incentives for conducting directed economic experiments with the 
industry-wide returns. There are numerous challenges with implementing such a proposal in general and/or 
in this specific context. For discussion of one such proposal, see Abromowicz and Duffy (2007). 
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during the writing and passage of the Act. The Act focused on introducing competition into 
telephony and designing a structure to replace the waning influence of Judge Harold Greene, 
who had presided over many regulatory rulings for the telephone industry for many years 
after the AT&T divestiture. The growth of the Internet was not ignored, but it was not central 
to the legislation. 
Prior to the Act, an “information service” was exempt from common carrier 
regulation and obligations. In the past such exemptions had supported robust economic 
experimentation in private equipment markets (e.g., telephone handsets or routers) and 
related services (e.g., bulletin boards). To make a very long story short, these exemptions 
also nurtured competition in the Internet access market, though a fair reading of history 
suggests this last outcome was an unintended but happy accident, not a deliberate regulatory 
goal.
41  
The Act borrowed many elements from these prior regulatory practices. After its 
passage these policies were challenged, but questions about Internet policy were rarely 
considered in isolation from other policy issues about voice telephony (which is not a 
surprise because the latter involve much larger economic activity in terms of revenue). In that 
sense, litigation concerning the implementation of the 1996 Telecom Act over the next 
decade considered many open questions that touched on core features of regulation for 
Internet access markets, but typically those discussions became wrapped up in fights over, 
for example, access charges, rights to unbundled elements of a local telephone company’s 
network, and the rights of local telephone monopolies to enter each other’s territory.
42  
These developments allowed an open question to fester in the late 1990s: what 
regulatory obligations and defaults govern broadband carriers, if any, other than general legal 
obligations that apply to all firms, such as contracting law?
43 This question coincided with 
                                                 
41 Though that outcome arose out of specific regulatory cases and markets, these rules were not imposed 
with a vision of the Internet. See e.g., Cannon (2001), Noll (2002) or Owen (2007). For further analysis of 
how these contributed to innovative behavior of Internet access market participants, see Greenstein (2007). 
42 This statement necessarily simplifies a complex history. For example, for ISPs and Internet access the 
first large change of federal policy at the FCC concerned the practice of “reciprical compensation” for 
CLECs, many of whom offered services to ISPs. This ruling was issued in early 1999. For various views of 
this and subsequent rulings, see e.g., Owen (2002), Sidek (2003), Goldstein (2005), Neuchterlein and 
Weiser (2005), Frieden (2006), Greenstein (2007), or Speta (2007). 
43 There also was uncertainty about the legal obligations of ISPs and hosting companies for their content. 
Much of this was clarified by litigation involving the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and, particularly, 
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another issue in broadband regulation. Cable firms were already exempt from common 
carrier obligations throughout the 1990s, while telephone companies were not exempt. As 
cable firms and telephone firms came into competition for provision of broadband to 
households, it was apparent they faced different costs due to different regulatory 
obligations.
44    
By the late 1990s, federal policy could have taken one of two directions (away from 
the status quo). Either regulation could be imposed on cable firms so they became regulated 
more like telephone firms or regulation could be removed from telephone firms so they 
became regulated more like cable. In the first type of policies cable firms would be required 
to interconnect their networks to others. In the second type of policies telephone firms would 
be exempt from interconnection obligations for Internet traffic carried over broadband lines.  
As it turned out, federal policy moved a step towards opening up cable networks a bit 
(as a condition for the Time-Warner merger), but then moved in the opposite direction a short 
time later, under its new chair, Michael Powell, who sought to initiate a broad range of 
changes to the FCC’s approach to regulating convergence between voice, data and video. In 
2002, the FCC ruled that Internet service over cable lines was an “information service.”  This 
ruling effectively allowed cable firms to keep their networks closed to ISPs beyond the 
specific agreements made for the merger.  Though challenged in court, this ruling survived a 
Supreme Court review several years later (in a case labeled Brand-X for short).
45 Several 
years after the FCC adopted the Brand-X ruling, broadband services from telephone 
companies became classified as information services as well. The signal decision came in 
August, 2005, when the FCC reclassified DSL facilities from local telephone companies.   
This is not to say that the FCC stood silent about the regulation of carrier conduct. 
Rather, it initiated an approach that differed from the existing precedent. Michael Powell 
issued some guiding principles about how Internet carriers should behave, calling these the 
                                                                                                                                                 
came under immediate court challenge after passage. Though the challenges to the latter Act originally 
involved principles of free speech, the relevant cases ended up clarifying the role of intermediaries. See, in 
particular, the summary in http://www.cybertelecom.org/cda/cda3.htm, or the timeline of events 
http://www.cybertelecom.org/cda/cdaref.htm. Accessed April, 2007. 
44 None of this was a mystery. Many observers in the 1990s forecast the need to end this asymmetry. For a 
summary of this debate at the beginning of the millenium, see e.g., Hausman et al (2001) Noll (2002), 
Owen (2002), or Neuchterlein and Weiser (2005). 
45 See the summary in http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-277.ZS.html.      Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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“four freedoms.”
46 These underwent a change with the appointment of his successor 
chairman, Kevin Martin, who issued a set of declarations on September 23
rd, 2005. These 
declare that users should be able to access the entire lawful Internet, along with a few other 
principles.
47   
Net neutrality advocates were motivated by the perceived lack of restraints on 
broadband carriers that emerged after Brand-X (and related decisions) and were particularly 
unsatisfied with Martin’s principles. Unlike typical FCC rulings, these declarations of 
principles were, and are, just that -- declarations. They have some force, but they do not have 
the weight of regulatory rulings or precedent behind them.
48 They also are vague on details. 
In particular, the principles do not describe minimal acceptable quality, how it will be 
enforced, or what process the FCC expects to use to adjudicate a dispute.   
Despite such ambiguities, these principles have influenced key events. For example, 
near the end of its filings, AT&T (formerly SBC) suggested conditions it would accept in 
exchange for the FCC’s permission to merge with Bell South. It agreed to follow the set of 
FCC principles for DSL providers for the next 24 months after its merger.
49  
Reinterpreted through the lens of economic experiments, this brief history of 
broadband regulation shows a trend in the last half decade: regulatory rules have been 
changed to raise the incentives for directed economic experiments by telephone firms and 
cable firms when they act as Internet broadband carriers. Is this trend worrisome? Net 
neutrality advocates believe it is, though usually this concern is articulated in language that 
only partially overlaps with that used to analyze economic experiments. I next consider how 
                                                 
46 Specifically, these are: (1) Freedom to Access Content: Consumers should have access to their choice of 
legal content; (2) Freedom to Use Applications: Consumers should be able to run applications of their 
choice; (3) Freedom to Attach Personal Devices: Consumers should be permitted to attach any devices they 
choose to the connection in their homes; (4) Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information: Consumers 
should receive meaningful information regarding their service plans. See Powell, Michael (2004).  
47 Specifically, these are: (1) Consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice; 
(2) Consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law 
enforcement; (3) Consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the 
network; (4) Consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and service 
providers, and content providers. 
48 A useful summary comes from James Speta (2007), who says, “A policy statement is a statement of how 
the agency intends to exercise its regulatory discretion. It is not binding on the agency, and any party 
against whom an enforcement action may be brought can defend by arguing that is action (even if contrary 
to the policy statement) did not violate the applicable statute and substantive regulation.”  
49 Similar conditions emerged from negotiations for the Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T mergers. These are 
due to expire in October 2007.  The conditions for the AT&T and Bell South merger expire in mid 2009.   Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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to reinterpret this debate through that lens.  
 
IV.2. Reinterpreting the starting point for debate    
 
The usual starting point for the debate about net neutrality begins with an analysis of 
the state of demand behavior and supply conditions. These concerns get combined in the 
following open question: does a cable or local telephone firm have enough market power to 
retain or lose many customers when it fails to innovate, offer lower prices, or experiment 
with new services?  
The answer matters for understanding the process of value creation because, if users 
can directly punish providers for higher prices or inadequate service, then broadband 
providers will be restrained by the usual discipline of the market. That is, when these firms 
take undesirable actions, grumbling customers will take their business elsewhere. If users 
tend not to leave their providers after higher prices and inadequate service, then the 
competitive incentives to innovative will tend to be weak. In other words, from an economics 
perspective there is little to debate if competitive supply characterizes carrier markets. 
As it turns out, the majority of customers – households and small businesses – do not 
reside in locations served by many providers. Moreover, the number of these broadband 
users should continue to grow in the next few years, because adoption of broadband has not 
yet slowed – especially among households.  
More specifically, despite a contraction in the provision of competitive telephony and 
data carrier service after the competitive crash of 2000, as of this writing, most large 
businesses in central urban locations in the United States can choose among many providers 
of broadband services. If there is an issue with market power in the provision of broadband 
service, it exists for everyone else – i.e., small and medium enterprises and households 
outside of very dense city locations. For a variety of reasons related to the costs of building 
broadband, most of these potential users have access to no more than two broadband 
suppliers—a cable company and a local telephone company. In less dense settings, there is 
only one supplier, if any.
50 The next-best alternative, satellite, is much more expensive. Until 
further wireless devices deploy (such as Wi-Max), most observers expect it to stay this way.  
                                                 
50 For a discussion of the reasons, see e.g., Greenstein (2005).  Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
  35
 While large businesses generate a large amount of traffic and, also, account for a 
larger proportion of revenue than their numbers, they are also very small in numbers. As of 
the last count, there are just over 150 thousand establishments in the US with 100 or more 
employees in the private non-farm sector of the US economy. In contrast, there were over 
seven million business establishments of smaller size (87 percent of those are under twenty 
employees), and 113 million households.
51 There are no hard statistics about business use of 
the Internet by all types of businesses, but most data indicates that businesses of all sizes 
have high rates of adoption.
52 More concretely, most recent statistics indicate that over 30 
percent of households have a broadband connection at home.
53 Most analysts expect many 
households with dial-up connection will convert to broadband within the next several years.
54  
There is a related open question about the intensity of competitive behavior between 
cable firms and DSL providers as they compete for new customers. Does this type of 
competition for new revenue support strong incentives to innovate? There is disagreement 
among debaters. This disagreement survives because the current empirical evidence for or 
against any hypothesis is mixed. There is little information about consumer switching 
behavior or the cross-price elasticities between different modes of broadband.
55 On the one 
hand, there has been a recent and well-documented build-out of facilities to serve new 
adopters.
56 On the other hand, evidence about pricing does not find anything dramatic: there 
has been no significant drop in the official US consumer price index for the component of 
Internet access devoted to broadband over the last eight years.
57   
                                                 
51 See Statistical Abstract of the US, 2007, Table 738, Establishments, Employees, and Payroll, and Table 
56, Households, Families and Subfamilies. 
52 Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2003) present estimates for Internet use by establishments with 100 
or more employees at the end of 2000. They find rates of adoption close to 90% for simple applications, 
such as browsing and email, with some variation across industries between 80% and 99%. They discuss 
likely adoption rates for smaller businesses, noting, for example, surveys of households who “access the 
Internet at work” show levels between 60 and 80%, depending on the survey year. See NTIA (2004).  
53 Broadband adoption in the US, Pew Charitable Trust (2006) or NTIA (2004).    
54 See, e.g., Pew Charitable Trusts (2006).  
55 The literature supports a range of inferences. For example, see Rappoport et al (2002) or Hausman et al 
(2001) for evidence that dial-up prices does not act as much of a constraint on broadband prices. Using a 
different approach, Savage and Waldman (2005) find a high willingess to pay for broadband among a 
certain set of users, but do not estimate elasticities for the marginal user.   
56 Both the FCC surveys and the Pew Charitable Trust surveys find a large growth in Internet lines for 
households in which virtually all of that growth occurred after 2000. See, e.g., Federal Communications 
Commission (2007), Table 3, and Pew Charitable Trusts (2006).  
57 This index focuses on households, not business expense, so it is only partially informative. Between the 
end of  1997, when the index first begins, and 2006, when the most recent annual data is available, the price Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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There is an additional and distinct concern that often gets confounded with the above 
points – whether a firm with market power in its retail Internet markets can shape innovative 
behavior in other parts of the Internet. On questions about innovation the emphasis on 
economic experiments yields new insights. The next section addresses that topic.  
  
IV.3. Future Scenarios for economic experiments    
 
A focus on economic experiments identifies three overlapping concerns in the 
discussion about net neutrality. In general, few of these concerns apply to settings where 
carriers only inhabit carrier markets. Instead, most apply to settings where the scope of 
carrier interests extends beyond just data. Here these are labeled as concerns about the 
inequity scenario, the mixed incentive scenario, and the less-innovative content scenario.   
The inequity scenario:  Every futurist forecasts improvement in broadband 
technologies. Futurists foresee multiple tiers of service in retail markets: a low-price, low-
quality option; and at least one high-price, high-quality option. Users are expected to 
segment themselves among the options. Bandwidth hogs will pay more for the resources they 
use.  
On the surface this forecast would not seem to contain any features that stir 
controversy. Many markets work this way, so why not broadband? The debate becomes 
provocative with a couple additional pieces of speculation. First, many futurists forecast that 
access firms will imitate the marketing behavior of cable television firms. For example, the 
premium tier of Internet service might include proprietary Internet video on demand, other 
IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) of various forms, and instant messaging with proprietary 
webcams, all arranged and supplied by the access firm for high-tier users.    
Net neutrality advocates argue that a carrier with market power has incentives to 
encourage purchases of the highest tier, where the profit margins are more lucrative. In this 
scenario, broadband firms will neglect the other tiers in comparison. That is, they will put 
together a bland basic bundle and invest all marketing and organizational resources in the 
more profitable high-priced bundles. Moreover, there is a concern that over time the firms 
                                                                                                                                                 
index dropped 7.8 percent. The only dramatic change occured in the late fall of 2006 and early 2007. 
However, this fall in the price index had nothing to do a drop in broadband prices in late 2006. It occurred 
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will shift most of their budgets to economic experiments for the higher tier, improving it with 
each new lesson, and not performing the same activities for the basic tier. 
Net neutrality advocates argue that that several years of investment at the upper tier 
will lead to an advanced Internet that remains available to only a small part of society. On the 
one hand, this is plausible on the surface. Mass-market users might not first experience new 
applications arising from new economic experiments. Fewer economic experiments will 
yield fewer lessons aimed at the mass market, resulting in a cycle of experimentation that 
reinforces the inequality.  
On the other hand, many historical examples demonstrate that economic experiments 
aimed at one segment of users often spread to other segments. In other words, it is not 
obvious why lessons learned in the upper tier will remain exclusively there. 
The concern about inequity motivates various policy proposals. For instance, the 
extant literature has debated the merits of proposals to prevent price discrimination at the 
retail level. Reinterpreted through the lens of economic experiments, such a proposal will 
introduce distortions to investment, such as economic experiments to develop other 
instruments for achieving similar ends – i.e., directed experiments aimed at developing 
services for achieving price discrimination in spite of it not being allowed. For example, it 
would induce broadband firms to invent proprietary software applications that generate high 
margins and that sort between high and low bandwidth users. Generally speaking, such 
investments are wasteful because they would be motivated by a desire to undo the effect of a 
regulation.  
In summary, the concerns of the inequity scenario receive little support in the 
economic experiments framework. Lessons learned in one segment likely would move to 
another and imposing retail price regulation would induce distortions. 
Mixed incentive scanerio: This scenario begins from the premise that most broadband 
carriers have their own voice service. That motivates an open question: why would a 
broadband firm undertake an economic experiment that deliberately helps the market 
interests of another provider of voice over IP (VoIP) that competes with the access firm’s 
own services? Wouldn’t a broadband firm simply watch what another firm does, then imitate 
it by offering its own service, kicking the competitor off its own lines? These questions arise 
because broadband carriers are a complement to someone else’s production of service that Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
  38
substitutes for the carrier’s own service. That situation creates poor incentives for the carrier 
to support the other firm.  
Net neutrality advocates see their suspicions confirmed in a recent regulatory case 
over the must-carry obligations of firms to VoIP providers (called Madison River).
58 If net 
neutrality advocates are to be believed, many such conflicts are just around the corner. Many 
are forecast after the expiration of the conditions imposed for telephone mergers.  
Since the economics of this scenario are easily understood, this is the one case that 
most lends itself to traditional regulatory approaches, such as restrictions on incumbent 
behavior or limits to incumbent lines of business. Opponents say that the traditional 
approaches are too restrictive on incumbent action and move too slowly to permit carriers to 
conduct viable economic experiments. They say that Madison River is just such a case where 
the four principles worked well. The FCC did intervene to stop the blocking of VoIP.   
In the economic experiments framework, these concerns receive attention for one 
primary reason: a broadband firm can adopt actions that reduce the imposition of negative 
externalities (on itself) by limiting economic experiments that others can generate. Had one 
firm been allowed to do this, then others would have followed. The foregone industry-wide 
gains from these economic experiments could be large if a broadband firm adopts policies 
that have wide impact on many other firms. That concern justifies policy intervention if a 
suitable intervention exists. 
Net neutrality advocates have argued that one way to regulate such mixed incentives 
is to specify acceptable network management practices. Acceptable practices include, for 
example, blocking viruses, authenticating customers, or managing traffic to give high quality 
service to the greatest number of users by restricting the use of the network by bandwidth 
hogs. Unacceptable practices include, for example, blocking competitor traffic or prohibiting 
or restricting attachments from competitors if these provide a competitive advantage to the 
carrier’s commercial interest.  
There is an open question whether this list of acceptable management practices 
should include requiring broadband carriers to release information to other content providers 
if content firms claim to need it to mount an effective application that competes with those 
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sponsored by the carrier.  I return to this question in the next section. 
Net neutrality opponents argue that lists of acceptable actions are easier to make in 
general than enforce in their specifics, and many practices have ambiguous implications for 
learning behavior.
59 In addition, there is an argument that enforcing any set of rules will 
impose a laborious regulatory and legal process on all parties, reducing the extent of 
experimentation by everyone.
60 
In summary, the lens of economic experiments does not settle many of these debates 
in their specifics. Rather, this lens highlights one issue: there are settings where broadband 
carriers can take actions which impose negative externalities on many others. Seen in that 
light, this lens highlights a key open question: how could such negative externalities be 
addressed while also permitting/encouraging carriers to conduct economic experiments? I 
will say more about this question after addressing the third worrisome future scenario. 
Less innovative content cycle:  This scenario concerns the incentive of broadband 
firm to charge different rates to different content providers. It overlaps with concerns about a 
broadband carrier’s incentive to create new applications or new business alliances. Net 
neutrality advocates worry about a firm with market power making such deals without 
restraint.  
Net neutrality advocates often begin discussing this issue by quoting Ed Whitacre, 
CEO of AT&T (formerly SBC), who declared in an unchecked moment “Now what [many 
content providers] would like to do is use my pipes for free, but I ain’t going to let them do 
that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there’s going to 
have to be some mechanisms for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion 
they’re using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes?”
61  
The extant literature has debated whether the basic economics of this statement apply 
in a wide range of situations or might be flawed in some circumstances. As it turns out, this 
debate has implications for an analysis of economic experiments.   
Standard price theory suggests that if a firm can price discriminate at the retail level, 
it may not necessarily gain from charging content providers different wholesale rates. The 
reasoning is quite established: if there is only a finite amount of value available, there is no 
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60 For various articulations of this argument, see, e.g., Noll (2002), Wu and Yoo (2006), Owen (2007). 
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way to double dip – i.e., a firm cannot increase the amount of value available in the value 
chain. So goes this argument, firms will try to extract value by any means possible, and 
attempts to prevent it just lead to distortions. For example, a carrier might not be able to 
segment its population perfectly using only retail segmentation strategies, in which case 
wholesale pricing can be a useful instrument for supplemental value extraction.
62 This line of 
reasoning concludes that there is no reason to worry about whether a provider takes its value 
in the retail end or wholesale/connection charge; it is the same value in either place.  
Farrell and Weiser (2003) challenge this line of reasoning, providing an extensive list 
of plausible reasons why a carrier might want to price discriminate both at the retail level and 
at the wholesale level. Of most relevant to the less innovative-content scenario, they provide 
reasons why wholesale price discrimination can play a strategic role to further a carrier’s 
interest. It can be used to reduce the competitiveness of supply, raising a rival’s cost by, for 
example, raising (directly) the costs of reaching end users for whom both the content 
provider and carrier compete. Such action is especially damaging to society when new 
entrants can commercialize service in ways that make it superior to the incumbents’, an 
outcome incumbents might seek to delay. 
Reinterpreted through the lens of economic experiments, the net-neutrality debate 
thus takes issue with the premise behind the double-dipping logic. That is, economic 
experiments can lead to the possibility that total value (to be split among carriers and content 
providers) is not fixed. It can be higher or lower if carriers take action. Particularly 
worrisome are situations where carriers take actions that are privately beneficial – either to 
protect existing markets or related commercial investments and relationships – and have the 
consequence of reducing the incentives of other firms to conduct economics experiments that 
could create value.  
This concern borrows themes from the prior analysis of mixed incentives.  After 
signing deals with content providers, a carrier has an incentive to protect its own commercial 
interests and directed experiments, pricing in a way to disadvantage other potential providers 
of new Internet applications. In other words, a carrier takes the position as a complement in 
production to someone else’s service that potentially substitutes for a service they or a 
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business partner provide. Carriers also can choose to enter service markets where they can 
use their discretion to disadvantage a potential competitor.   
Numerous hypothetical scenarios in the net neutrality debate spin variations of this 
concern. Once an access firm has an economic relationship with an adventuresome video 
site, what is to stop it from sharing revenue if it steers traffic to the partner? What is to stop 
the access firm from excluding from its enhanced tier any competitor to the preferred partner 
site, even a young YouTube? Net neutrality advocates worry that business will become more 
difficult for young experimental sites that do not (or cannot) prearrange contracts with 
broadband firms. They worry that the bargaining costs of making deals with carriers after 
demonstrated success will interfere with the incentive to innovate in the first place. 
Seen through the lens of economic experiments, there are two concerns. First, a 
carrier can use pre-innovation contracting to generate market conditions that limit entry of 
innovative content providers. Second, carriers can use post-innovation bargaining to 
strategically aid their competitive position. There are a variety of reasons why both of these 
are a general concern, because the carriers may intend to imitate content providers, may 
intend to compete through provision of their own service, or may intend to compete with 
alliance with another content provider. And there are a variety of ways for a carrier to take 
such action.     
This lens raises an important qualifying point. These hypothetical scenarios are not 
complete arguments unless they compare one counterfactual outcome against another 
appropriate counterfactual. In other words, while a broadband carrier might discourage some 
content firms, a complete analysis must recognize that carriers might use their discretion to 
encourage others with whom it can coordinate an economic experiment. That is, a broadband 
carrier has an incentive to use private contracting to generate economic experiments that 
benefit its business. Even if the worry about carrier contracting behavior is correctly placed, 
it has to be compared against the additional contracting carriers will conduct to support 
directed economic experiments. The comparison between industry-wide experiments under 
these two hypothetical situations will involve both positive and negative. 
Advocates call for regulations requiring broadband carriers give services to others at 
the same cost as they give their own divisions. This includes a ban on exclusive deals by 
carriers with content providers. Advocates also call for transparent policies from carriers Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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about how they treat the traffic of other parties. As seen in other aspects of the debate, 
opponents to such provisions see such regulations doing more harm than good, and they 
anticipate that regulations will reduce a carrier’s incentives to conduct direct economic 
experiments, with a concomitant reduction in benefits to their users and to others learning the 
lessons that spread.      
Interpreted through the lens of economic experiments, the open question for this 
scenario is similar to that for the mixed incentives scenario: What policies will address 
concerns about a carrier’s incentive to shape the learning behavior of others, and, 
simultaneously what policies will permit/encourage a carrier to continue to conduct 
economic experiments? 
 
IV.4. A proposal for a three-part test  
 
Policy can play a role nurturing economic experiments. Communications policy did 
in historical circumstances. However, it played this role as a happy accident in the past, as 
was seen with the Internet access market. The lens of economic experiments focuses 
attention on a key difference: it focuses on policy orienting towards that goal and explicitly 
committing to it.  
Reinterpreted through this lens, what is the principal challenge faced by a deliberate 
policy?  No market participant knows the best option for creating and delivering economic 
value, so it is in society’s interest to have both broadband carriers and others conduct directed 
economic experiments. However, there is a difference between a situation where carriers are 
just carriers, and when they involve themselves in many complementary markets. While 
broadband carriers do have incentives to support economic experiments when these raise the 
value for their carrier services, they do not have strong incentives to support economic 
experiments from firms who conduct experiments that have a potential to compete with their 
own (carrier) interests.  
If this type of reasoning guides policy, what would it look like in practice? This is not 
a trivial detail in practice. Decision making could fall in the domain of several different Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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agencies, and that alters the practical details behind policy formation and implementation.
63  
To keep the explanation focused on the trade-offs between competing principles for 
encouraging economic experiments, I will frame the answer as if the regulatory system the 
FCC has adopted in the last several years continues to operate (in a somewhat idealized 
form). Generally speaking, this is a system that grants discretion to broadband carriers, but 
within oversight of a federal agency that places broad limits on that discretion by announcing 
principles in advance, deferring interpretations until specific circumstances give rise to 
problems.   
For purposes of this analysis I will treat the FCC’s declaration of principles as a step 
towards meeting such a commitment. For purposes of this reinterpretation, the fourth of 
Kevin Martin’s principles is most pertinent. It states: “Consumers are entitled to competition 
among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers.”  
The statement accommodates environments where carriers have incentives to support 
economic experiments from others, in which case there is no need for policy intervention. It 
does not provide much guidance, however, about regulatory policies for a setting where 
broadband carriers and others bargain while each attempts economic experiments aimed at 
commercializing innovations.   
If increasing economic experiments is a policy goal, then the open question becomes: 
what types of actions from broadband carriers impose negative externalities on the value 
creation of others, and can regulators identify these actions in a systematic manner as part of 
a strategy to prevent them? Since circumstances change one year to the next, it is impossible 
to try to develop a specific answer. Any specific proposal also risks becoming rigid and 
inappropriate as technologies change. Rather, policy must adapt an approach that helps all 
parties predict its application under different circumstances.  
What might that look like? Any proposal would aim to make regulator and carrier 
behavior predictable for a targeted set of circumstances. That is, policy would aim to address 
a core concern of the net neutrality debate: that the threat of some carrier action that could be 
taken after a demonstration of a commercial experiment will, in practice, discourage another 
                                                 
63 This question arises precisely because the FCC has declared broadband carriers to be information 
services and not be common carriers, and the Brand-X decision gives the FCC authority to reverse itself. 
Under the present declarations it is not obvious what legal authority the FCC has to regulate conduct 
(though, to date, that has not stopped the FCC from intervening in a few select cases). This awkward state 
of legal authority has not gone unnoticed. For a discussion, see, e.g., Speta (2007).     Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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firm from ever making the investment in the first place. Simultaneously, the policy would 
seek to not discourage a carrier from undertaking an economic experiment.   
I borrow insights from prior thinking about the role for competition policy in 
innovative industries where firms offer complementary services.
64 Such policies trade off the 
interests of the two parties – in this case, a carrier and a content provider, where one has 
market power – in this case, a carrier. These policies presume the preponderance of carrier 
behavior requires no intervention, i.e., many actions would be allowed under this test. This is 
deliberate, as the test seeks not to limit a carrier’s economic experiments except in a narrow 
range of circumstances.   
The policy takes the form of a test which delineates a set of alarming circumstances 
from all others. Following prior work, I propose a three part test. These questions are:   
•  Does the incumbent carrier possess market power and use it when bargaining 
with others?   
•  Are the scrutinized tactics closely affiliated with non-innovative behavior?  
•  Is there a rationale under which a reduction of user choice is in the user's 
interest?  
What would this test permit? By way of illustration, consider that a broadband carrier 
can use almost any contractual requirement when it supplies services to business users in a 
dense urban market. Since business customers in dense urban markets have access to many 
providers and can move between them in the presence of poor practices, policy would not be 
concerned with contractual actions of carriers in this market.  
It also permits considerable discretion if a carrier is just a carrier, even if the carrier 
has market power, as found in most residential markets. It would permit almost any 
contractual feature if that contractual feature has an apparent benefit for user choice, such as 
increasing the menu of options available to users (e.g., supporting multiple tiers of 
bandwidth), as well as a wide range of pricing actions in residential markets, such as retail 
price discrimination between low and high bandwidth services. It also permits a range of 
wholesale/connection charges in the same set of circumstances, with several important (and 
potentially binding) limitations to discretion described below. 
                                                 
64 This proposal borrows from Greenstein (2002). For general discussion of these issues, see, e.g., Arora, 
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What would this test not permit? As illustration, consider applying it to the actions 
scrutinized in Madison River. First, the carrier had market power with its customer base. 
Second, the scrutinized tactic, blocking of VoIP, served no innovative purpose. Third, the 
blocking of an additional choice reduced user choice without any associated savings in cost 
or lowering of prices or increase in the quality of existing service from the carrier.
65 This 
three-part test would lead to a prohibition on blocking of VoIP, the result in that case. 
The three questions also divide along familiar lines for identifying acceptable 
managerial practices. It would permit any carrier, even one with market power, to block 
viruses, authenticate customers, or manage traffic, as these actions support user interests in a 
functioning network. However, it would lead to scrutiny of a carrier with market power who 
blocks competitor traffic, or prohibits or restricts attachments from competitors, since such 
practices rarely benefit users seeking to try innovative new services.  
Perhaps a more interesting illustration arises when carriers seek to offer more services 
than just carrying data. How would these three tests treat a carrier who proposes to make an 
exclusive deal – e.g., to distribute a firm’s content over their lines, and ban traffic from 
competitors whose content competes with it? In this case, the proposed test leads to a ban on 
an exclusive deal when it serves no innovative purpose (which it usually does not) and 
reduces user choice (which it usually does). In some respects, this result follows the familiar 
reasoning in antitrust economics, which views with suspicion exclusive deals when an 
upstream firm possesses market power and downstream firms do not. However, the reasoning 
related to economic experiments differs slightly. There is a potentially large loss to the extent 
of industry wide economic experiments from reducing entry of innovative content, 
particularly when the value of a new entrant is unknown. There is an especially large 
potential loss to industry-wide economic experiments from reducing the potential for an 
innovative entrant with a transformative experiment.  The loss to society from allowing 
carriers to have exclusive deals seems too great.  
One extension of a ban on exclusive deals is a proposal for “must carry” provisions. 
Such a provision would prohibit a carrier with market power from blocking traffic over one 
                                                 
65 Notice that if the VoIP from another firm interfered with the ability of Madison River to manage its own 
service, then this principle does not give a clear-cut answer about how to trade-off those costs. In that 
sense, it leans toward giving broadband firms discretion, subject ot the natural concern that carriers cannot 
invest excuses to exclude others. 
 Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
  46
tier while a making it available on another tier. The reasoning in favor of must-carry is 
similar to that for banning exclusive deals: a must-carry provision supports value creation by 
content providers by reducing most anticipated post-entry bargaining problems. The test also 
highlights (practically-minded) exceptions to this reasoning, as might arise, for example, if 
congestion on a low-bandwidth line is severe and, as in some cable Internet architectures, 
increasing use by one user may shape the experience of many. In such a case, targeted 
reduction of choice to relieve congestion issues could serve an innovative purpose. A 
different type of exception arises when a peer-to-peer application threatens the security of all 
network users. Once again, a ban on such an application could serve an innovative purpose.  
In practice, this proposal only partially addresses two large open questions in the net 
neutrality debate, i.e., about carrier requirements for sharing of information, and about price 
discrimination of wholesale access. The proposed three-part test leads to an unambiguous 
answer in only extreme cases. An illustration can show why. For example, had Madison 
River refused to provide relevant technical information to the VoIP provider or charged an 
extremely high price to the VoIP provider, its actions would have been virtually equivalent to 
blocking the rival. This test would lead to the conclusion that extreme use of these practices 
should be banned. 
On the other hand, the proposal does permit information secrecy when it serves a 
useful innovative purpose, such as assessments of the potential value of new applications for 
an existing customer base. It also would allow for wholesale price differences between 
applications that use high bandwidth when the broadband carrier has no economic business 
interest in the relevant application market, such as when a frontier peer-to-peer application 
heavily uses available capacity for one user’s benefit and the carrier has no economic interest 
in any peer-to-peer applications.
66  
The difference between one extreme example, where a practice is forbidden, and one 
not-so-extreme example, where a practice supports economic experiments, highlights a 
drawback with this proposal: these three questions do not give a sharp answer for every 
relevant situation. While it would be a surprise for any single proposal to give a sharp answer 
to all open questions, this ambiguities leaves open opportunities for a market participant to 
                                                 
66 Once again, note the relevance of the qualification: if a carrier makes a deal with Yahoo (e.g., to make 
Yahoo its default portal) the carrier would have an economic interest in the relevant application market for 
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push a boundary, inviting costly regulatory and legal wrangling about the definition of that 
boundary. The appropriate question to ask is whether that cost comes with a benefit that, on 
net, exceeds the cost/benefit of the present situation, as carriers with market power try to 
commercialize services, shape economic experiments nation-wide, and simultaneously work 
out the meaning of the four vague principles governing the Internet.   
The lens of economic experiments leads to a general policy approach that is not 
common within the extant net neutrality debate. It leads to a forward-looking set of 
guidelines to encourage value creation. As illustrated above, it would favor some “must-carry 
provisions” and ban “exclusive deals” when market power is present and a carrier has 
commercial interests in an application market. This is consistent with suggestions coming 
from net neutrality advocates. On the other hand, it leads to favoring discretion over pricing 
at the retail level and at the interconnection/wholesale level, limited primarily by the type of 
principles found commonly in the antitrust analysis of contracting practices. That is 
consistent with common suggestions among net neutrality opponents. 
In summary, the lens of economic experiments sheds new insight on the net neutrality 
debate. It focuses attention on preserving the incentives of both broadband carriers and others 
to conduct directed economic experiments. It draws a distinction between settings where 
carriers choose to be just carriers and when they choose to do more. In the latter, it focuses 
attention on the role policy can play when broadband carriers do not have strong incentives 
to support economic experiments from firms who conduct experiments that have a potential 
to compete with carrier commercial interests.  
 
 
 V. CONCLUSION 
  
Focusing on the role of economic experiments leads to a shift in perspective on the 
creation of value. Both directed and undirected economic experiments played a valuable role 
in the development of commercial Internet access. Generally speaking, many firms 
participated in economic experiments, and, though the participation took a variety of forms, 
many firms gained substantial private benefit from the lessons learned. Market, technical, 
heuristic lessons spread quickly between firms, while complex business lessons spread more Economic Experiments    Shane Greenstein 
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slowly. As a result, the industry-wide benefits from economic experiments were substantial, 
and though many of these gains were measurable, many were not.  
There is an irony embedded below the surface of this analysis. Firms conduct 
economic experiments to resolve uncertainty about the underlying determinants of market 
value. Yet, as it typically turns out, no firm’s experience can be viewed in isolation of others, 
and by taking actions, each firm teaches others lessons, which, in turn, lead to more 
experiments. While all this interplay is inextricably linked to the creation of value for the 
industry, the interplay between firms increases the possibility for the emergence of an 
undirected economic experiment, itself creating another barrier to making any near-term 
forecast about the creation of value at a specific firm.  In other words, each firm may take 
action to reduce uncertainty, but together the actions may lead to more uncertainty, not less. 
This environment raises many challenges for communication policy. Due to innate 
measurement challenges and the heterogeneity in experiences across firms, there is no way to 
say in any given instance whether costs from economic experiments exceed their benefits at a 
private or industry wide level. In general, policy might presume that the industry wide from 
economic experiments exceeds private value due to the presence of positive information 
externalities between firms and over time. A major exception arises in settings where the 
negative externalities are present and large, a situation that a targeted policy would seek to 
address.  
Those insights lead to a reinterpretation of the net neutrality debate. The central 
policy concern is that post-innovation bargaining by carriers can be used to strategically aid 
its competitive position. The carriers may intend to imitate content providers, may intend to 
compete through provision of their own service, or may intend to compete with alliance with 
another content provider. In all cases, carriers with market power have incentives to raise a 
rival’s cost. Hence, carrier action can reduce incentives for investment by content providers 
to support an economic experiment.  The lens of economic experiments focuses attention on 
preserving incentives to conduct economic experiments by both broadband carriers and 
others. It focuses attention on the role policy can play through targeted intervention against a 
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